(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Yoel Guzansky - How is it that countries that have spent astronomical sums over decades purchasing some of the world's most advanced weapons systems remain relatively passive vis-a-vis Iran and struggle against its proxies to independently defend their own territory and critical infrastructure? The Arab monarchies of the Gulf turned to investing extraordinary resources in building up their military capabilities. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and even Bahrain and Oman consistently rank among the world's leading countries in military expenditure. They possess air forces equipped with advanced generations of Western fighter jets, air defense systems, precision-guided munitions, naval vessels, UAVs, and advanced intelligence, command, and control systems. Yet massive procurement has not translated into military effectiveness. Modern military power depends on the quality of personnel, operational experience, readiness, command-and-control, inter-service interoperability, and the capacity to learn. Some Gulf states lack the ability to fully and independently operate and maintain certain advanced systems they have acquired. Resources directed toward expensive platforms are not necessarily matched by comparable investment in munitions stockpiles, spare parts, maintenance personnel, hardening, logistics, redundancy, personnel training, and expanding the conscription base - components that are far less visible politically, but critical in wartime. For Arab monarchies, a strong, autonomous, cohesive military may also pose a potential internal threat. This has led to institutional fragmentation, parallel forces, national or presidential guards, and the division of responsibilities among different centers of power. From the standpoint of regime survival, dispersing power reduces the ability of any single actor to seize control of the system. From a military standpoint, however, it can undermine unity of command, information sharing, joint planning, and the capability to deploy all available resources as a unified system. In countries with small populations, training skilled pilots, technicians, engineers, intelligence personnel, systems operators, and staff officers cannot always keep pace with the rate of advanced weapons acquisitions. Moreover, in wealthy countries, educated young people have access to well-paid and comfortable career alternatives and a military career is not always the most attractive option. For Israel, the Gulf states' limited military effectiveness means that while they can be important political and economic partners, the scale of their arms procurement should not be taken as a sign that they are a reliable military pillar. A robust regional front against Iran therefore requires a substantial improvement in their military effectiveness and their ability to operate together over time. The writer, who formerly coordinated Iran and Gulf affairs at Israel's National Security Council, is a senior researcher at INSS.