Israel News
Daily Alert
Israel and Hizbullah Maintain a Tense Ceasefire in Lebanon
on June 22, 2026
(New York Times) David M. Halbfinger -
Israel and Hizbullah maintained a tense ceasefire in Lebanon for a second day on Monday. "Israel will respect the ceasefire in Lebanon as long as it won't be breached by Hizbullah," Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar posted on Monday. "We don't have territorial ambitions in Lebanon, but we will not withdraw from the security zone and expose our citizens to Hizbullah's attacks and possible invasion."
On Saturday, the Israeli military said it had received "updated directives" from the country's political leaders and would no longer be "conducting proactive strikes" in Lebanon. The new orders stated that troops may only fire to counter an immediate threat unless authorized by the chief of staff.
Israeli soldiers are specifically barred from firing warning shots at civilians attempting to return to southern Lebanon, unless they get too close to the soldiers. Approval of senior officers is required to blow up homes and other infrastructure inside the security zone.
U.S. and Iran Agreed to Set Up "De-confliction Cell" for Lebanon
on June 22, 2026
(New York Times) Leo Sands -
Pakistani and Qatari mediators said Monday that the U.S. and Iran had agreed to create a "de-confliction cell" to keep the peace in Lebanon. It would include representatives from Iran, the U.S., Lebanon, Qatar and Pakistan, but not Israel and Hizbullah.
U.S. State Department Opposed Creation of New Mediation Mechanism for Lebanon
on June 22, 2026
(Israel Hayom) Danny Zaken -
According to sources familiar with the matter, the State Department strongly opposed the creation of the "de-confliction cell" for Lebanon, arguing that Iran's goal was to sabotage direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon by creating a bypass route.
Iran Steps Up Hangings of Dissidents
on June 22, 2026
(Wall Street Journal) Henna Moussavi -
At least 45 people have been executed in Iran this year on political charges, ranging from spreading propaganda to espionage, according to human-rights groups and Iranian state media. Other loosely defined capital offenses used against political dissenters include "enmity against God" and "corruption on Earth."
Most of those death sentences have been carried out in the past three months, as the authorities have hurried to send a message that dissent won't be tolerated. In addition to the hangings, thousands of alleged traitors and spies have been arrested in recent months, according to Ahmad-Reza Radan, head of Iran's Law Enforcement Command.
Netanyahu: If Rockets Were Threatening the U.S., What Would America Do?
on June 22, 2026
(Ynet News) Nina Fox -
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday: "Can you imagine if, across the border from the United States, you had an army of thousands of terrorists who pelt your cities and towns with rockets and ballistic missiles and killer drones? They kill your soldiers, they kill your citizens, they kill your children. And they threaten them every day. What would America do? Would it say, 'well, there's nothing we can do. Let's hold our fire?'"
"You know very well what America would do. It would cross the border, create a security zone, kill the terrorists, and protect its people until the threat is removed. That's exactly what we are doing."
An Israeli source noted that "there is no American demand for a small or large withdrawal" from Lebanon. He said that in negotiations with Lebanon, "we have been talking about 'pilot' areas where the Lebanese army will be able to demonstrate its ability to make the area free of Hizbullah....The pilot will be accompanied by the United States to ensure the Lebanese army succeeds in its mission."
Israel and the U.S. Agree: No IDF Withdrawal from Southern Lebanon for Now
on June 22, 2026
(Israel Hayom) Danny Zaken -
The dialogue between Israel and the U.S. on Lebanon has produced understandings that an Israeli withdrawal is not currently on the table. Forces on the ground will be limited to removing various threats and completing the clearing of terrorist infrastructure in the area south of the yellow line that Israel drew in southern Lebanon.
It was agreed that there would be closer coordination between the IDF and U.S. Central Command. This will not only mean notifying the Americans before significant Israeli action, but also providing continuous updates, both on Hizbullah violations and on IDF activity.
Major Israeli offensive operations, such as a strike in the Beqaa Valley, will require high-level Israeli diplomatic approval. Iran is facing an American demand to explain why Hizbullah is attacking, after Israel and other intelligence organizations, including Arab ones, passed along information indicating that the orders to Hizbullah to escalate the war are coming directly from Tehran.
Israel Sets Terms for Withdrawal from Lebanon
on June 22, 2026
(Israel Hayom) Lilach Shoval -
IDF troops are now positioned at all the entrances to the concrete, fortified Hizbullah command post located on the Ali Taher ridge in the Beaufort area of southern Lebanon. Dozens of Hizbullah terrorists are trapped there inside an underground bunker, which was used to manage fire against IDF soldiers and communities in northern Israel.
The IDF is holding its fire at the instruction of Israel's political leadership. The IDF does not intend to withdraw from the site until the terrorists are eliminated or surrender, followed by the destruction of the underground infrastructure.
There is consensus among the top political and senior military leadership that Israel should not withdraw from the yellow line inside Lebanese territory. Israel has three minimum conditions for withdrawing its forces from southern Lebanon: the withdrawal of all Hizbullah forces north of the Litani River; the dismantling of Hizbullah's terrorist infrastructure south of the Litani; and full Israeli freedom of action to remove threats.
Inside a Hizbullah Underground Drone Fortress
on June 22, 2026
(Ynet News) Elisha Ben Kimon -
Majdal Zoun, a Lebanese village 10 km. from the Israeli border overlooking the Tyre valley, includes a military fortress that Hizbullah had built over decades under the cover of civilian life. From here, IDF officials said, fire was repeatedly directed at communities in the Galilee, and terrorists set out from the area to carry out attacks.
Lt.-Col. A. said, "This village is a stronghold. Most of the houses here were filled with weapons systems, communications equipment, machine guns, anti-tank missiles, explosive devices and launch sites." The centerpiece of the operation lay deep underground, with an entrance wide enough for vehicles to drive inside with ease. Its structure and fortifications resemble the underground Iranian missile tunnels.
Inside, on the concrete floor, are dozens of dismantled drones, bodies and wings arranged almost like a production line. At the end of the corridor is a reinforced concrete room containing tons of explosives and weapons.
Palestinians Attack Israeli Community with Firebombs and Burning Tires
on June 22, 2026
(Jerusalem Post) IDF soldiers spotted several Palestinians burning tires and throwing firebombs toward the Israeli community of Karmei Tzur, south of Jerusalem, on Sunday. The soldiers killed two and injured a third.
The Implications of the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding
on June 22, 2026
(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Col. (res.) Eldad Shavit and Sima Shine -
The memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the U.S. and Iran is an interim framework primarily intended to halt a war that President Trump no longer wished to pursue. Iran presents the memorandum as a ceasefire rather than a capitulation. It shifts the core issues into a framework of ongoing crisis management, providing Trump with a narrative of victory while also granting Iran economic and diplomatic breathing room.
The deferral of detailed discussions on the nuclear issue to the final agreement constitutes an achievement for Iran, as it allows Tehran to conduct the next round of negotiations after the U.S. has already relinquished some of its key leverage. Iran immediately receives significant economic and military gains, without being required to take concrete steps beyond reopening the Strait of Hormuz - something it itself needs.
The MoU grants Iran early relief and a pathway toward sanctions removal, while the issues most critical to Israel - enriched material, the future of enrichment, monitoring, missiles, Iran's proxies, and freedom of action in Lebanon - are deferred to the final agreement or not addressed at all.
Eldad Shavit, a senior researcher at INSS, served in senior roles in Israeli Defense Intelligence and the Mossad. Sima Shine, director of the Iran and Shi'ite Axis program at INSS, served as Head of the Research & Evaluation Division of the Mossad.
Iran's Oil Windfall Fuels Rapid Rebuild of Missile Array
on June 22, 2026
(Israel Hayom) Danny Zaken -
In just one week, Iran brought in nearly $3 billion through the export of 36 million barrels of oil. ; This is a flood of cash from which Iran had been cut off during the U.S. naval blockade, which nearly brought its economy to complete collapse. Most of this money goes to companies belonging to the Revolutionary Guard, which tightly controls Iran's oil sector.
On an annual basis, Iran's income from oil sales at the current pace would reach about $100 billion a year, more than double its revenue in the years before the war. The Revolutionary Guard will use these funds for rebuilding military power, the missile array, aid to regional terrorist organizations, chiefly Hizbullah, and strengthening the regime against domestic opposition. President Masoud Pezeshkian admitted this week that a large portion of Iran's treasury was transferred to the Revolutionary Guard during the war.
Many Arabs Vehemently Oppose the U.S. MoU with Iran
on June 22, 2026
(Gatestone Institute) Khaled Abu Toameh -
Many Arabs, including prominent Gulf analysts, academics, former officials, and Lebanese commentators, have publicly voiced concerns about the Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and the Iranian regime. Their objections are similar to those expressed in Israel: the agreement strengthens Iran, weakens America's credibility, ignores Tehran's regional proxies, and leaves America's allies vulnerable.
The concerns are especially pronounced in the Gulf states and Lebanon, where people have firsthand experience with Iran's destabilizing activities. Officials from the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait reportedly complained that they were largely excluded from discussions that directly affect their security. Many Gulf officials are particularly alarmed that the agreement fails to address Iran's ballistic missile and drone programs.
The perception that Iran forced Washington into concessions no doubt emboldens
jihadist groups that believe they have defeated both the U.S. and Israel.
Iran Revives Its Claim to Bahrain
on June 22, 2026
(Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs) Lt.-Col. (ret.) Michael Segall -
A June 21, 2026, column in Iran's
Kayhan, "Let Us Not Keep Our Bahraini Compatriots Waiting," repeats Iran's claim that Bahrain is occupied Iranian territory whose people await reunification with the homeland. The column is the latest in a recurring series asserting Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain. It appeared immediately after a war in which Iran fired on Bahraini soil and Bahraini Shiite citizens were arrested for celebrating this.
The writer, former head of the International and Iranian Desks in IDF Intelligence, served as a senior analyst at the Jerusalem Center.
The Ceasefire Now Pressed upon Israel in Lebanon Amounts to the Reconstitution of Hizbullah
on June 22, 2026
(JNS) Aviram Bellaishe -
A ceasefire that does not deal with Hizbullah does not halt the next war; it lets Iran rebuild the tool meant to wage it. In the West, war is meant to produce a diplomatic achievement; the agreement is the endpoint. For Iran, one can lose militarily and still win at the table; an agreement is time to regroup for the next war. Just as Iran will use any pause to rebuild its military and nuclear infrastructure, so, too, the ceasefire now pressed upon Israel in Lebanon amounts to the reconstitution of Hizbullah for the coming campaign.
In recent months, the Lebanese government began a difficult move against Hizbullah's weapons. The U.S.-Iran agreement endangers this momentum. Hizbullah will rebuild its power on the claim that its Iranian patron is still standing, still reaching an agreement with the U.S., still forcing Lebanon back into the regional equation in a way that shields Hizbullah. This is an Iranian victory on Lebanese soil.
The territory Hizbullah lost to Israel must pass to the Lebanese army, not return to Hizbullah. Israel will no longer allow Hizbullah to entrench on its border.
The writer, vice president of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, served in senior government positions for 27 years.
Israel Cannot Give Up Its Freedom of Action Against Hizbullah
on June 22, 2026
(Israel Hayom) Dr. Yossi Mansharof -
Iran is attempting to impose a new deterrence equation on Israel, in which any significant Israeli action against Hizbullah in Lebanon, particularly in Beirut's Dahiyeh district, would trigger a direct Iranian response against Israel. Iran seeks to position itself as the ultimate arbiter of the scope of Israeli military activity in Lebanon.
However, history suggests that accommodating Iranian threats does not moderate Tehran's conduct; it encourages further demands. Accordingly, sustained military pressure on Hizbullah must be complemented by diplomatic engagement with the Trump administration to clarify that acquiescence to Iranian consolidation runs counter to American interests.
Resisting Iranian efforts to impose a new deterrence equation is a strategic imperative. It requires rejecting attempts to constrain Israel's freedom of action through threats. In the Middle East, and especially in Tehran, restraint driven by fear of escalation is often interpreted as weakness. Experience suggests that Iran's ambitions are more likely to be curbed by resolve than by accommodation.
The writer is a senior researcher at the Misgav Institute for National Security and Zionist Strategy.
Criticism of Hizbullah Increases among the Shi'ites in Lebanon
on June 22, 2026
(Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center) Since Hizbullah renewed hostilities in support of Iran on March 2, 2026, more than 3,700 people have been killed in Lebanon and more than one million have been displaced, along with enormous property damage, primarily in the Shi'ite strongholds of south Lebanon, the Beqa'a Valley and the Dahiyeh neighborhood in Beirut.
Coming while the Shi'ite community is still recovering from Hizbullah's previous hostilities in support of Gaza (Oct. 8, 2023-Nov. 27, 2024), the heavy human and economic costs have intensified signs of dissatisfaction in Hizbullah's centers of power and support.
For the first time in years, there has been public Shi'ite criticism of Iran and the concept of the "resistance axis," with claims that the two most recent rounds of hostilities served Iranian interests while the Shi'ite community paid most of the price. The growing frustration has led to a Shi'ite search for an ideological alternative to Hizbullah, based on loyalty to the Lebanese state, and prioritizing reconstruction and development over military confrontations.
Yet at this stage there are no particular signs of a collapse in Hizbullah's Shi'ite support base or the emergence of an organized political alternative.
Poll: Israelis Place Security over Withdrawals, Say Buffer Zones Essential
on June 22, 2026
(JNS) A new survey commissioned by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs found that most Israelis support maintaining defensible borders and security zones in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and the Jordan Valley. ; 64% support a permanent military buffer zone in Gaza, while 73% support maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River.
"The Israeli public has drawn a clear lesson from Oct. 7 and the security developments of recent years: national security cannot be based on hopes, international guarantees, or assumptions that have proven inadequate," said JCFA President Dan Diker. "Most Israelis now understand that defensible borders, strategic depth, buffer zones, and an Israeli security presence in vital areas are indispensable components of national defense."
60% of Israelis support maintaining Israel's security presence in Syria. 57% said Israel must keep a permanent military presence in the Jordan Valley, irrespective of any future political deal. 61% oppose any agreement that would require a full withdrawal from Judea and Samaria without Israeli-controlled buffer zones or security mechanisms. 56% said Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza was a strategic mistake.
How Americans Misread Iran, Jihadism, and the Prospects for Peace
on June 22, 2026
(Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs) Dr. Irwin J. Mansdorf -
A comprehensive public opinion study of 500 American adults conducted in the aftermath of the war with Iran reveals widespread public ignorance regarding the jihadist ideology of the Iranian regime and its historical connection to events like the Sept. 11 attacks. 40% (50% of those under age 29) could not say whether jihadism mandates Muslim rule over non-Muslims. A substantial portion of the public expressed highly optimistic views regarding the immediate chances for lasting peace with Iran.
The study reveals that the American public's thinking regarding Islam is largely driven by an overwhelming culture of "political correctness" that has become deeply embedded across the U.S. Open, objective, and critical discussions about the geopolitical realities of radical political Islam are frequently discouraged or sanitized to avoid giving offense, replacing objective analysis with an institutionalized reluctance to confront the theological and political drivers of the conflict.
The writer is a clinical psychologist and a fellow at the Jerusalem Center, specializing in political psychology.
How Alliances Work
on June 22, 2026
(Commentary) Abe Greenwald -
Vice President JD Vance said on June 18, "If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally that I have anywhere left in the entire world." Vance's premise is false. Israel has relations with dozens of countries and maintains significant strategic partnerships throughout the world, even with countries that criticize it obsessively. And while Vance claims that Israeli cabinet members are personally attacking Trump, they've merely commented on the Iran deal and what it means for Israel.
The vice president wasn't describing an alliance. He was describing a dependence that strips a nation of the right to disagree. What Vance is talking about is obedience. That's not how alliances work. The U.S. has never expected Britain or any other ally to surrender its voice in exchange for American protection. In a healthy alliance, partners are free to speak candidly when interests diverge. The alliance works because it's rooted in shared aims and shared values, not because one side has purchased the silence of the other.
Zionism emerged, in part, as a rejection of the idea that Jews should live at the mercy of leaders whose favor could be granted one day and withdrawn the next. Actually, Israel is the only country at this moment that's been unwavering in its support for the president and the only country that's proved itself fighting alongside the U.S. in ages.
The U.S. Navy's 1847 Expedition to the Holy Land
on June 22, 2026
(Substack) Lenny Ben-David -
U.S. Navy Lt. William Francis Lynch led a government-sponsored expedition to the Holy Land in 1847 and published his findings in Narrative of the United States' Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, five years later. Lynch was also a strong adherent of "Restorationism," a precursor to Christian Zionism, believing that the Jewish people must return to the Holy Land as part of the fulfillment of biblical prophecy.
Lynch described the Jordan River's raging rapids, difficult terrain, unusual flora and fauna, warring Arab tribes, and suffering Christian and Jewish communities. Photography was not yet available, so Lynch and his crew relied on illustrations to accompany the expedition record.
The writer, a former AIPAC official and Israeli diplomat, is a research fellow at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.
Review: Israel on Trial
on June 22, 2026
(Washington Free Beacon) Prof. Eugene Kontorovich -
Israel on Trial: Examining the History, the Evidence, and the Law, by Roy K. Altman, a federal judge in Miami, rebuts the six claims he has most often encountered that aim to undermine the Jewish state. It challenges the claim that Israel is an illegitimate "settler colonial project" and focuses on Israel's supposed conduct.
He provides excellent distillations of the abundant archaeological evidence for Jews' indigeneity in the Land of Israel and also shows how this has not impeded their willingness to make repeated territorial concessions in the name of peace, detailing six occasions on which the Jews agreed to the creation of a Palestinian state, only to have the Arabs reject it. He notes that "if anyone has colonized the Land of Israel, it has been [a] succession of Muslim armies."
Israel's purported genocide consists of not preventing all civilian casualties while fighting a lawful war of self-defense against an enemy that purposefully puts civilians in the line of fire, and inflates their casualty statistics if, due to Israel's extraordinary precautions, not enough of them are killed. Jews are falsely accused of genocide for not allowing their own genocide.
The writer is a professor at George Mason University Law School.
With the Iran MoU, the U.S. Is Buying Time to Prepare for the Future
on June 22, 2026
(Free Press)
Michael Doran -
At first glance, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) looks like a wish list drafted in Tehran. It grants Iran consultations with Oman on regulating traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and even a $300 billion reconstruction fund to help rebuild and modernize Iran. In return, the U.S. receives a vague and completely dishonest commitment not to pursue a nuclear weapon.
However, let's rewind to Feb. 4, 2025, when Trump announced that the U.S. intended to turn Gaza into "the Riviera of the Middle East." 16 months later, no developer has broken ground on a beachfront resort in Gaza City. 16 months from now, there will be no $300 billion pouring into Iran. No consortium of international investors will ever commit that much money to Iran's jihadist regime.
The MoU's primary goals are to halt the fighting and to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Convincing the Iranians to reopen the strait required concessions. With midterm elections looming, the political math was unforgiving. Trump calculated that retreat, however inelegant, was preferable.
His critics see this move as surrender, offering Iran a pathway to rebuild its nuclear program, proxy network, and ballistic missile arsenal, while demanding nothing in return. This analysis is overwrought. First of all, Trump revitalized the credibility of the American military threat.
During his second term, Trump has ordered three major military operations against Iran: against the Houthis, and against Iranian nuclear and military sites. Each time, the operation ended abruptly. But the cumulative effect has degraded Iranian power severely and quickly. Trump's tactical retreat is real, but so are the war's achievements.
The president's critics want us to believe that the MoU marks a definitive and permanent surrender, leaving Iran free to behave as it pleases. A more sober assessment would conclude that Trump is buying time. If Iran seeks to revitalize its nuclear program and protect it with a shield of ballistic missiles, Trump's record suggests that he will strike again.
One area where Trump paid a higher price than necessary is Lebanon and the linking of reopening the Strait of Hormuz to Israeli operations against Hizbullah. By accepting that linkage, Trump restored a source of Iranian leverage that battlefield successes had largely eliminated. No Israeli government can absorb Hizbullah attacks while refraining from military action.
The writer is Director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at the Hudson Institute in Washington.



