(Il Tempo-Italy) Interview with Oded Ailam - President Trump likely believes that a limited, surgical strike could shock Tehran into accepting terms closer to American demands. Right now, we are in the assessment phase, waiting for Iran's formal response and weighing whether negotiations can be stretched further. Operation "Rising Lion" in June 2025 inflicted real and measurable damage, but it did not erase Iran's strategic capabilities. The scientific knowledge, the engineering cadres, and the industrial DNA remain intact. With potential technical assistance from North Korea, the recovery curve could shorten. So while the program is wounded, it is not amputated. On Iran's long-range ballistic missile arsenal, out of 584 launchers, 178 are currently assessed as operational. Iran is rebuilding them remarkably fast, with material and technological backing from China and Russia. Current projections suggest that by the end of 2026, Iran could field 2,000 missiles and 600 launchers. That is not a marginal threat. It is a strategic one that remains very real, not only to Israel but to the wider region. Many assessments suggest that a very large majority of the population - 75-80% - rejects clerical rule. Even among traditional Shiite supporters there is growing recognition of where this path has led. Yet fragility does not equal imminent collapse. The brutal suppression of the protests was designed not only to crush dissent but to inject lasting fear. That reality weighs heavily on public willingness to re-mobilize. And the lack of alternative leadership is crucial. If a military operation unfolds, it would begin with a coordinated cyber offensive designed to blind, disrupt, and delay Iran's ability to respond, striking key Iranian military networks, air defense systems, missile launch control systems, and nuclear command-and-control nodes. Conventional air and missile assets would then target nuclear sites, missile production and launch infrastructure, and IRGC command and control centers, including targeting key prominent figures. If Iran retaliates by striking oil and gas infrastructure or attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the campaign could expand with strikes on the primary export hub at the Kharg Island oil terminal, the South Pars gas field, and the Abadan and Bandar Abbas oil refineries. Regime change in Tehran, if it comes, will not be a consequence of a single strike. It would likely occur not because of street protests alone, but when the elite concludes that the current path is leading to disaster. At that point, the shift would come from within, perhaps led by elements of the security establishment or senior clerical figures. History shows that external pressure can accelerate internal fractures. When perception shifts inside the elite, events can move suddenly. Oded Ailam, former head of the Counterterrorism Division in the Mossad, is a researcher at the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.